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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 11, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 79-770-CFX
EPA

Cert to CA4
Widener)

(Haynsworth,

v.
NAT'L CRUSHED STONE ASS'N
COSTLE (Admin. EPA)

Cert to CA4 (Butzner, Widene ....,_._
, ____
Hall)

v.
CONSOLIDATION COAL CO.
1. SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely (w/extns)

EPA challenges two judgments of the CA4,

claiming a conflict among the CAs on the question whether

(

Act,

lh

-/UU

;yvs

-~
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33

u.s.c.

§

13ll(b) (1), must include a variance provision

requiring EPA consideration of the ability of an individual
discharger of pollutants to afford the costs of compliance.
EPA also suggests that CA4 erred in considering the validity of
the variance clauses at issue before those clauses were applied
to any individual discharger.
2. STATUTORY BACKGROUND:
adopted in the Federal

~~ater

Section 30l(b) of the Act,
Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, authorizes EPA to issue two sets of industrial

established in 1977 based on "the best practicable control
technology currently available," referred to as BPT
limitations; and regulations to go into effect not later than
~

July 1, 1987, based on the "best available technology
economically achievable," referred to as BAT limitations.

(At

the time of this Court's opinion in E.I. du Pont de Nemours &

u.s.

Co. v. Train, 430

112 (1977), the BAT limitations were to

have been effective by July 1, 1983.

The effective date was

postponed by the Clean Water Act of 1977.)

This Court's du

Pont opinion established EPA's authority to enact BPT
limitations by regulation on an industry-wide basis, "so long
as some allowance is made for variations in individual
plants."

430

u.s.

at 128.

Consideration of the standard

~

variance provision that EPA had developed was deemed by this
Court to be premature at that time, however.
n.l9.

I

The~

See id. at 128

presented in this case concerns the scope of

the variance provision included in EPA regulations governing
the BPT limitations established for two industries.
/

- 3 The Act lists factors that are relevant to EPA's
determination of what the "best practicable control technology"
and "best available control technology" requires.

Section

304(b} (1} (B) states that factors relevant to the BPT
limitations include:
consideration of the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits
to be achieved from such application, and shall also take
into account the age of equipment and facilities involved,
the process employed, the engineering aspects of the
application of various types of control techniques, process
changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including
energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate . . . .
Section 304 (b) (2) (B) lists the factors to be taken into
account in assessing the more stringent BAT limitations.

They

are identical except that they do not include "consideration of
the total cost of application of technology in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved."

However,

§

30l(c)

of the Act does provide that the Administrator may modify the
requirements of the BAT limitations for a particular discharger
of pollutants who can show that such modifications "(1} will
represent the maximum use of technology within the economic
capability of the owner or operator; and (2} will result in
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the
discharge of pollutants."
3. FACTS and OPINIONS BELOW:

In April, 1977, the EPA

adopted regulations establishing BPT limitations on discharges
from existing point sources in coal preparation plants and
other subcategories of the coal mining industry.

In July,

1977, the agency published similar regulations governing the
\

crushed stone and construction sand industry.

Both

- 4 -

l~

promulgations included EPA's standard variance provision for
BPT limitations.

In brief, that provision allows the permit

issuing authority (EPA or state agencies with Nat'l Pollutant
Discharge Elimination Systems) to consider whether the
individual discharger's cost of compliance with the limitations
significantly exceeds the costs of other dischargers in the
same industry.

This provision is designed to permit an

individual discharger to show that its costs of complying with
the BPT limitations will be greater than the average costs
considered by EPA in establishing the national guidelines.
The issuing authority may not consider or grant a variance,
however, based upon a claim that an individual discharger
cannot afford the "best practical technology."
EPA's position is that

§

In effect,

30l(c) 's allowance of waivers based

upon plant-specific considerations of economic hardship is
applicable only to BAT limitations.
Petitions to review both sets of regulations were filed in
various CAs, and all were ultimately transferred to CA4.
a. Nat'l Crushed Stone
In Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, the CA remanded
several substantive regulations to the EPA for
reconsideration.
issue here.

Those substantive regulations are not at

With respect to the variance provisions, the CA

ruled that they did not comport with its earlier opinion in
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1358-60 (CA4
1976), and remanded them to the EPA for compliance with that
earlier opinion.

(The relevant portion of the opinion is

'
repr1nted
at pp.I 29a-35a of the petn.)
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The regulations at issue in Appalachian Power had
established BPT limitations on the discharge of heat into
navigable waters from steam electric generating plants.

The CA

found that the variance clause included in those regulations,
identical to the clause contained in the sand and crushed stone
regulations, permitted consideration of technical and
engineering factors, exclusive of cost, in granting variances.
The CA concluded that thus interpreted, the clause was unduly
restrictive.

The CA's conclusion was based on the fact that

the more stringent BAT limitations contemplated waivers based
on cost; logically, the temporary BPT standards should be no
less flexible.

Moreover, theCA found that EPA's standard

variance clause did not include consideration of factors
specifically set forth in

§

30 4 (b) ( 1) (B) , such as the total

cost of applying the best practicable technology and the
non-water quality environmental impact.
In Nat'l Crushed Stone, the CA found that the standard
variance clause suffered from the same deficiencies as had the
()....

clause in Applachian Power.

It rejected EPA's claim that

review of the clause would be premature prior to any actual
claim for a variance in a discharge permit application because
EPA's position on such applications had been made clear in
administrative opinions.

The CA did note that EPA had

promulgated a new policy with respect to variances on August
21, 1978, which would have placed the agency's views more in
line with Appalachian Power, but that policy specifically noted
that "EPA continues to beli e ve that

§

30l(c) • . . applies only

\

to • • • (BAT) limitations."

See 43 Fed. Reg. 50042 (1978).

,.

--··--. ,.._._....
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Thus, EPA's policy remained inconsistent with Appalachian
Pov1er, which had required the agency to take § 301 (c)

into

account in developing its variance provision.
TheCA rejected EPA's argument that the

§

30l(c)

requirements would permit plants to obtain a variance simply
because they could not afford to comply with the BPT

limitation~

Rather,

§

30l(c) permits a variance only if the

plant is doing all that the maximum use of technology within
its economic capacity will permit and such use will result in
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the
discharge of pollutants.

EPA's argument, "no better than [a]

straw m[a]n," had been considered and rejected iri Appalachian
Power.

The argument was not even addressed to the principal

concerns of the industry challengers to the variance, who
wanted specific factors, other than affordability, to be
considered in applications for variances.
Finally, the CA noted that its construction of the variance
provisions were in general accord with that of the CADC in
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (1978).

That court

had held that a BPT variance clause must be analogous to a BAT
variance clause, as CA4 had held in Appalachian Power.
b. Consolidation Coal
In the Consolidation Coal case, a different panel of CA4
held that the substantive BPT limitations regulating the coal
mining industry were valid.

The industry challengers also

complained, however, that the variance clause in those
regulations failed to require the permit issuing authority to
consider the factors set forth in

§§

301 (c) and 304 (b) (1) (B) of

- 7 -

·.

the Act.

The CA noted that the clause

a~

issue was identical

to the clause considered in Nat'l Crushed Stone, and remanded
the variance regulations for revision in conformity with the
opinion in that case.

(The relevant portion of the opinion is

reprinted at pp. 50a-52a of the petn.)
3. CONTENTIONS:
a. The SG
Despite that court's conclusion to the contrary, the GA
contends that the views of CA4 are in conflict with the views
of the CADC in Weyerhauser.

In Weyerhauser, CADC held that an

identical variance clause, included in the regulations
governing the pulp paper industry, can be applied with
sufficient flexibility to enable the court to conclude that it
provided for the meaningful variance required by this Court's
du Pont decision.

The CADC also concluded that the ability to

secure variances from the BPT limitations requirements should
be analogous to the statutorily provided ability to secure
variances with respect to the more stringent BAT limitations.
590 F.2d at 1034.

However, with respect to the relevance of

economic hardship, CADC concluded "emphatically,'' that:
Although the ''total cost" of pollution control at the
petitioning mill must be considered under a satisfactory
variance provision, it is only relevant "in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved" at that mill,
section 304(b) (1) (B); so long as those costs relative to
the pollution reduction gains are not different from those
that may be imposed on the industry as a whole, the
difficulty, or in fact the inability, of the oper~tor to
absorb the costs need not control the variance decision.
590 F.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original).

Thus, the SG asserts

that CADC's opinion conflicts with the opinion of CA4.
\

/

- 8 -

The SG contends that this issue is important because the
identical variance clause has been issued in regulations
~

governing 40 other industries.

If CA4's view is followed, and

pollutant dischargers can obtain exemptions from BPT
limitations requirements on the basis of their inability to
afford the requisite technological controls, Congress'
objective of eliminating pollution of the nation's navigable
waters will be frustrated.
Finally, CA4's view is inconsistent with the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments.

Congress deliberately adopted

the BPT limitations as a minimum level of effluent control that
all dischargers must meet, even if the cost of compliance with
those limitations would drive some dischargers out of
business.

CA4 ignored this legislative history when it based

its decision on the abstract logical proposition that the less
stringent requirements of the BPT limitations should be as
flexible as the more stringent requirements of the BAT
limitations, which allow for modifications under the standards
of§ 30l(c).

The reason that Congress wanted the BPT

limitations to be administered less flexibly is that those
requirements were intended to establish a minimum floor on the
control of pollutant discharge.
The SG raises a second question for review by this Court,
though his presentation of this question is somewhat
tentative.

He continues to argue, as the EPA argued below,

that judicial review of the variance clauses was premature
because no individual discharger has actually been denied a
variance.

However, because the EPA's position on the

- 9 -

interpretation to be given the variance provisions has become
clear, and because it presents a discrete legal issue, it may
be capable of pre-enforcement review under Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-53 (1967).

If the Court agrees

that the issue is not ripe, the SG asks this Court to grant the
petn and vacate CA4's judgment on that ground, so that EPA will
not have to modify the variance clause and the issue will be
preserved for enforcement review.

If the Court thinks that the

issue is ripe, the SG seems to invite it to limit a grant of
cert to the question presented on the merits.
b. The Respondents
First, resps contend that there is no clear conflict

c

between CA4 and CADC on the standards EPA must apply in
considering applications for a variance.

Both CAs agree that

the standards applicable 'under the BPT limitations must be
analogous to those under the BAT limitations; both agree that
the total cost of the technology in relation to the pollution
reduction benefits must be considered; and both agree that this
balancing of costs is but one factor EPA must consider.

The SG

ignores the fact that CADC's holding with respect to economic
hardship considerations stated that such considerations "need
not control the variance decision."
factors irrelevant.

It did not consider such

Moreover, CA4 rejected the EPA's argument

that its opinion made hardship a controlling factor:

§

30l(c)

requires that modifications based on economic capabilities of
the discharger also "will result in reasonable further progress
toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants."
Finally, in Weyerhauser the CADC conducted only a threshold

' .
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review of the BPT variance regulation governing the pulp paper
industry.

Actual variance decisions arising under the

jurisdiction of the CADC may provide this Court with the means
of resolving any concrete conflicts that develop between the
approaches of the two courts.

(In Weyerhauser, CADC observed

that the Appalachian Power approach to BPT variances may have
been "somewhat broader" than its approach, evidently not
perceiving the sharp conflict seen by the SG.

See 590 F.2d at

1036 n.35.)
Second, the issue presented does not raise an important
question impacting upon EPA's ability to administer the BPT
limitations.

c

The deadline for compliance with those

limitations was July 1, 1977.

Presumably, most petitions for

variances have been filed by now.

Moreover, Congress' goal of

eliminating pollutant discharges will not be frustrated under
CA4's approach, because progress toward achieving that goal is
made a relevant factor under § 30l(c).
Third, CA4's decision was correct.

The legislative history

quoted by the SG was not addressed to the standards applicable
to the approval of variances.

The requirement that variances

be provided for BPT limitations was established only after this
Court's opinion in du Pont.

Both du Pont and Appalachian Power

were decided prior to the 1977 amendments to the Act, and
Congress disapproved neither decision.

Moreover, the chairman

of the House conferees on the Act explained that the "total
cost" consideration required by§ 304(b) (1) (B) includes
"external costs such as potential unemployment."

Economic

capability is thus made a relevant factor in the consideration
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of variance applications even if one does not construe the
provisions of

§

30l(c) as applicable to BPT limitations.

Resps agree with the SG's secondary position that the
merits of the issue presented to the CA were ripe for review.
4. DISCUSSION:

I am inclined to agree with the respondents

that the conflict among the CAs alleged to exist here, if
indeed there is a conflict, is one that this Court need not
resolve.

CADC's opinion in Weyerhauser presents only a

~

~

~

tentative judgment that the EPA's standard variance clause may
(

be flexible enough to satisfy this Court's du Pont opinion.

In

actual variance decisions that arise from that circuit, a
clearer conflict with the approach followed in CA4 may emerge.

c

It seems just as likely, however, that dischargers will find
that issuing authorities under either CA's approach will reach
similar decisions on waivers because of the amalgam of factors
that are relevant.
The CADC's opinion also provides some support for the
resps' argument that the economic hardship concern made
relevant in § 30l(c) to BAT limitations is also relevant,
albeit under the total cost concept of§ 304(b) (1) (B), to BPT
limitations.

CADC accepted the definition of total costs

offered by the chairman of the House conferees, and it thus
concluded that "certain economic factors [potential
unemployment, dislocation, etc.] must be considered but
need not be decisive if associated with commensurate
pollution-ending gains, and they do not, without more include
the fact that the opertator is experiencing difficulty in, or

'
is unable to, absorb
the costs."

590 F.2d at 1036 n.35 (my

.·

... _l""f"O'

- 12 emphasis).

It was based on this interpretation of the total

cost concept that the CADC concluded that CA4's approach in
Appalachian Power "may be somewhat broader than ours and was
reached by a different analysis."

Id.

Given CA4's explicit

rejection of EPA's argument that Appalachian Power makes
economic hardship factors controlling in a variance
application, I fail to see how the two approaches can be
expected to yield differing results in many cases or how CA4's
approach will lead to frustration of the Act's purposes.

L

This is not to say that Weyerhauser is completely
consistent with the arguments made by the SG here.

1

( ...._'

One might

also conclude, however, that this Court's duPont decision,
requiring some variations in different plants, is not
completely consistent with the legislative history cited by the
SG.

My only point is that the conflict alleged to exist

between CA4 and CADC is theoretical at best, and may not lead
to dissimilar practical results.
The ripeness issue, as the SG concedes, is not
independently certworthy.
on that point.

There is no conflict among the CAs

Moreover, the decisions of CA4 and CADC appear

correct.
Although the question may be close, on balance I recommend
that the petn be denied.
Murphy

1her12.. cH~
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Ops in petn

To: The c>,J-:-r. .Ji. StJce
1

Mr. <h; ;:; t ' ·~a 13 !:'o:m:m
Jtfr. ,Tao~Jr~,;: 8'-~r.'·.V.lrt

Mr .

<Tu::Jt -~·:,] Mu'G~n.l l

Mr. J u;:;tJc.)
tt:V"<Tu:; :; ·:;;
Mr. Jurjt.~. .; ;J
Mr . Jw.; tlco

Bla·;bmn
Pu::0)1l
Ibl1:1 : ~t1is t :

Stev0ns

From: Mr. Jus t ice Whi te

1 7 JAN 1980

Circulat ed : __________
Rec i r culated:
Re:

79-770 - Environmental Protection Agency v. National
Crushe d Stone Association; and Douglas Castle ,
Administrator, EPA, v. Consolidation Coal Co.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
To achieve the national goal of eliminating the discharge
of pollutants into the Nation's. navigable waters, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Act), 86 Stat.
816, 33 U,S.C. § 1251 et seq., directs that by 1977 the discharge
of pollutants was to be limited to the extent made possible by
"the best practicable control technology currently available"
(BPT).

By 1987, more stringent limitations, based on "the best

available technology economically available" (BAT), were to be
observed.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was to

issue regulations to implement both of these standards, which
it proceeded to do.

These r egulations contained varianc e

clauses setting fo r th the grounds upon which the EPA or an
authorized state a gency could modify or ease the requirements
at the behest of an

\
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Relying on the statutory specification of the factors
to be considered in granting variances, as well as upon the
legislative history, the EPA contends that the fact that an
individual discharger may be financially incapable of footing
the bill for the best practicable control technology currently
available does not necessarily entitle the discharger to a
variance from the 1977 BPT limitations.

The Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit in the two cases before us disagreed
and invalidated the variances clauses contained in the regulations covering two different industries.
The petition for certiorari of the EPA asserts that the
two decisions will significantly affect its ability to enforce
the water pollution control laws, that they threaten similar
variance clauses in regulations applicable to a good many other
industries, and that Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), sustained the identical variance provision as
applied to the pulp and paper industry.

It seems to me that

this kind of an issue with respect to the construction of an
extremely important and relatively new and complex statute that
contains compliance target dates should be promptly settled by
this Court, particularly in light of the developing conflict
between two Courts of Appeals and the dilemma that these decisions pose for the Agency.

\

It is obvious that the issue

- 3 -

will recur, and the Court should give it plenary consideration
now, rather than later.
With all due respect, I would grant the petition for
writ of certiorari and dissent from its denial.

\
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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NA~
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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COUI:t'l' OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 70-770. Derided .Jnm111ry -, 1980

dissenting.
To achieve the national goal of eliminating the discharge
of pollutants iuto the Nation's 11avigable waters. the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Act),
86 Htat. 816, 33 U. S. C. ~ 1251 et seq., directs that by 1977
the discharge of pollutants was to be limited to the extent
made possible by "the best practicable control technology
currently available" (BPT). By 1987. more stringent limi~
tations, basetl on "the best availabl!'l technology economically
available" (BAT), were to be observed. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was to issue regulations to implement both of these standards. which it proceeded to do.
These regulations contained variance clauses setting forth
the grounds upon which the EPA or an authorized state
agency could modify or ease the requirements at the behest
of an individual discharger.
Relying on the statutory specification of the factors to be
considered iu granting variances, as well as upon the legislative history , the EPA contends that the fact that an individual
discharger may be financially incapable of footing the bill for
the best practicable control technology currently available
would not eutitle the discharger to a variance from the 1977
BPT limitations and need not be considered. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the two cas('s before us
disagreetl and invalidated the variances clauses contained in
the regulations covering two different industries.
The pPtition for certiorari of the EPA asserts that the two
decisions will significantly affect its ability to enforce the
MR. JrsTICE WHITE,

(JU. :Jti.CiO

2

EPA v. NATIONAL CRUSHED STOKE ASSN.

water pollution control laws, that they threaten similar variance clauses in regulations applicable tp a good many other
industries, and that Weyerhauser v. Castle, 590 F. 2q 1011
(D. C. Cir. 1978), sustained the identical variance provision
as applied to the pulp and paper industry. It seems to me
that this kind of an issue with res1~ect to the construction of
ap extremely important and relatively new and complex
statute that contains compliauce t~rget dates should be
promptly settled by this Court, particularly in light of the
d13veloping conflict between two Co4rts of Appeals and the
dilemma that these decisions pose for the Agency. It is
obvious that the issue will recur, and the Court shollld give
it plenary consideration now, rather than later.
With all due respect, + would grant the petition fo~ writ
of certiorari and dissent from its denial.
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April 25, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
Motion of Petitioners to
Dispense with Appendix

No. 79-770
EPA

v.
NATIONAL CRUSHED STONE
ASSOC., et al.

CA 4

The SG, on behalf of the federal petrs, and with the consent
of all parties, asks to dispense with printing the appendix because
the appendix to · the cert petn contains all necessary materials.
The reguest appears appropriate.
Marsel

4/15/80
PJC
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April 25, 1980
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned ............ ...... , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

79-770

EPA
vs.

NATIONAL CRUSHED STONE ASSOC.

Motion to dispense with printing the appendix and to proceed on the
original record.
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Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ... .
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Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J ............. .
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July 8, 1980
Linda,
Please advise each of my new clerks that
I am out of this case.
I do not want one of
them to spend time preparing a bench memo.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .
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November 12, 1980

70-770 EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association

Dear Byron:
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Sincerely,
,,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
The Conference
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